White Collar Corner -March 6, 2026

The federal white collar crime lawyers at Evergreen Attorneys are committed to providing the highest level of federal criminal defense to our clients across the country. As part of our dedication to being the top white collar crime attorneys in Colorado and nationwide, we publish a series known as the White Collar Corner.

What’s the White Collar Corner? It is a series of blog posts by the lawyers at Evergreen Attorneys that discusses and breaks down the newest developments in federal white collar criminal law, BOP news, and other items of interest for federal criminal law practitioners. We regularly cover recent cases of interest, changes in the federal prison system, or other substantive issues that we believe are important for lawyers and the general public to know about.

If you or someone you know needs help with the federal criminal justice system, do not hesitate to contact the lawyers at Evergreen Attorneys today. We can be reached at (303) 948-1489 or by email at [email protected]. Want to talk to Zach or David directly? Email us at [email protected] and [email protected].

About Us: Federal White Collar Lawyers at Evergreen Attorneys

Developments at the United States Supreme Court

Drugs and Guns: 922(g)(3) Oral Argument Update

We have previously written about our case before the Supreme Court which questions whether the statute criminalizing use of controlled substance and possession of firearms is constitutional. The lawyers at Evergreen Attorneys teamed up with the ACLU, CLEAR Project, and the esteemed Erin Murphy of Clement & Murphy who argued the case before the U.S. Supreme Court this past Monday.

We will not know the Justices’ decision until later this summer. However, many news outlets believe that the Court will find 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) unconstitutional in this as applied challenge. You can read more about the case and the media’s interpretation of the oral argument below:

https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/02/united-states-v-hemani-an-animated-explainer/

http://vox.com/policy/481254/supreme-court-hemani-marijuana-guns-second-amendment

https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/2026/02/hemani-oral-argument-preview

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/supreme-court-second-amendment-gun-ban-drug-users-hemani/

https://hunewsservice.com/news/supreme-court-reviews-federal-restrictions-on-drug-users-who-own-guns/

https://reason.com/2026/03/02/scotus-seems-skeptical-of-the-federal-ban-on-gun-possession-by-cannabis-consumers/

Following oral argument, we feel confident about the arguments that have been made and the questions the Justices asked. We will likely have an opinion from the Supreme Court this June.

If you want to listen to the oral argument yourself, you can do find it on the Supreme Court’s website by clicking here.

Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel When Testifying at Your Own Trial

Villareal v. Texas, No. 24-557 (Feb. 25, 2026)

Villareal was charged in Texas with murder and testified on his own behalf at trial. Not a very unusual situation. But what happens when that testimony is interrupted by an overnight recess? Is the defendant allowed to consult with his attorney during the break? That was the question before the Court in Villareal.

Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for the majority. Justices Alito, Thomas, and Gorsuch filed concurring opinions.

Long before Villareal, the Supreme Court held that a court may not prevent a testifying defendant from conferring with his lawyer during an overnight recess in Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976). Over a decade later, the Court limited that opinion somewhat to hold that a court may prevent a testifying defendant from conferring with his attorney during a brief daytime recess. Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989). So what makes the Villareal case different enough to garner attention from the Supreme Court?

Villareal presents a third scenario: an overnight recess that interrupts a defendant’s testimony, but where the judge allowed counsel to speak with his client during the recess but prohibited the attorney from “managing” the defendant’s testimony. Villareal’s testimony resumed the next day, and he was convicted and sentenced to 60 years. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction, and Villareal appealed to the Supreme Court on the grounds that the trial court’s order violated Villareal’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the 24-hour recess.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the fundamental right to consult with counsel. The Supreme Court, however, found that a testifying defendant is not just a defendant, but also bears the burdens of a witness in the criminal trial. One of those burdens is that the court can limit advice from counsel aimed at influencing the testimony in light of testimony already given. Relying on Geders and Perry, the Court used Villareal to draw a constitutional line between the two holdings.

The Supreme Court held that the trial judge did not violate Villareal’s Sixth Amendment right to confer with counsel by placing a qualified order on Villareal’s attorney. The Court found that the order only prohibited one thing: Villareal’s attorney could not manage his ongoing testimony in light of the testimony he had already given. This, according to the Supreme Court majority, fit neatly between the confines of Geders and Perry and was a permissible limitation.

Justice Alito wrote separately concurring that the trial court did not violate Villareal’s Sixth Amendment right.

Justice Thomas also wrote a concurrence in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Thomas believes that the majority’s opinion unnecessarily expands the Court’s precedents in Geders and Perry.

The Fourth Amendment: Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. When the government conducts an unreasonable and unwarranted search and seizure, the remedy is suppression of the evidence obtained from the search.

Of course, with all good things there are exceptions to the rule. What takes a search from reasonable to unreasonable requires a lot more discussion than a blog post. But, we do have several cases to report where the federal courts found the government’s action to violate the Fourth Amendment.

United States v. Majedi, No. 25-CR-00243, 2026 WL 207940 (D.N.M. Jan. 27, 2026)

Albuquerque police received a 911 call stating a man was waiving a gun around outside the caller’s apartment complex. When police arrived, they approached a car that matched the caller’s description. After an exchange with Majedi, officers arrested him and put him in the back of a squad car. After Majedi was arrested, the officers searched his vehicle and found a backpack in the trunk of the car that contained drugs. Majedi was charged with possession with intent to distribute controlled substances in the District of New Mexico.

Majedi filed a motion to suppress the drugs found in a backpack in the trunk of his car on the grounds that the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an unwarranted and unreasonable search of his vehicle after his arrest. In response, the government conceded that the search of the backpack and vehicle was not a valid “search incident to arrest,” but it also argued that the drugs should not be suppressed because they would have been inevitably discovered during a subsequent inventory search.

The District Court held a hearing on the motion to suppress and heard testimony from the responding officers as well as Majedi. The court found that officers had probable cause to arrest Majedi, but the evidence seized from Majedi’s backpack must be excluded because the backpack could not have been lawfully impounded and subject to an inventory search.

The court granted Majedi’s motion and suppressed the drugs discovered in the backpack from being introduced as evidence at trial.

United States v. Lujan, No. 24-CR-1023, 2026 WL 412726 (D.N.M. Feb. 13, 2026)

In another District of New Mexico case, the District Court granted a defendant’s motion to suppress based on evidence obtained where law enforcement unlawfully impounded the defendant’s vehicle.. Lujan had been previously convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced to 51 months imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised release. Lujan completed his prison sentence and was on supervised release which included a special condition that he submit to a search of his person, property, residence, vehicle, papers and computers by the probation officer during the three-year period.

While on supervised release, the DEA executed a search warrant for narcotics at a home where Lujan was purportedly living. Agents found drugs and cash in the home. Based on the search, the district court issued an arrest warrant for Lujan. Lujan was eventually arrested by the U.S. Marshals. The officers began searching the vehicle before there was any discussion about impounding it (Lujan stated it was not his vehicle and officers failed to contact the owner of the vehicle). Inside the car officers found a backpack with what appeared to be methamphetamine.

Lujan moved to suppress the contents of the backpack as an unlawful search and seizure. The Government argued that the totality of the circumstances based on reduced expectation of privacy for probationers and parolees excused the need for a warrant. The district court did not buy the government’s arguments.

The court first found that the search of the vehicle was not authorized under the totality of the circumstances exception. Specifically, part of the conditions of Lujan’s supervised release authorized the probation officer to conduct warrantless searches where reasonable suspicion exists, the search was conducted by U.S. Marshal’s Task Force members and not probation. “[N]either the status of Defendatn nor the fact that he signed a supervised release agreement constitute a blanket approval for warrantless searches of Defendant’s person or property by all law enforcement officers he encounters.”

The court also found that the government failed to demonstrate other exceptions to the warrant requirement applied. There was not sufficient probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband as required by the automobile exception. Further, the impoundment of the vehicle was found to be unlawful.

Lujan demonstrated his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. The government failed to show that any exception applied. Accordingly, the district court suppressed the evidence discovered as a result of the unlawful search.

United States v. Perez, No. 23-7280, 2026 WL 492012 (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 2026)

Perez presents yet another Fourth Amendment violation for a person on supervised release, but in a much different context than the New Mexico case. This case involves a civil forfeiture action against $25,325.00 in currency following the search of a home owned by a probationer, but occupied by a resident. Both the occupant and probationer moved to suppress the fruits of the search in the district court, but their motion was denied. They appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Fourth Circuit began its opinion by recognizing that the Supreme Court has held that a warrantless search of a probationer’s home may be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when it is supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation.

The Fourth Circuit concluded that a condition of supervised release that permits a warrantless search of a supervisee’s “property” does not permit the government to search real property owned by the supervisee and leased by a third-party resident. Additionally, the court of appeals concluded that in order to rely on the supervised release condition to search the lessee’s residence, officers must have probable cause to believe that the supervisee resides at the home. The government failed to meet its burden on appeal, and the Fourth Circuit found the warrantless search an unconstitutional violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court’s order denying the motion to suppress was reversed and held that the currency that was improperly seized was not subject to forfeiture.

Armendariz v. City of Colorado Springs, No. 24-1201, 2026 WL 503954 (10th Cir. Feb. 24, 2025)

About fifty people participated in a protest in Colorado Springs in 2021. After the protest, the Colorado Springs Police Department began investigating the conduct of some of the protestors. Law enforcement obtained three search warrants: two targets Armendariz and one targeting the Chinook Center, a nonprofit organization that helped to organize the event.

The first warrant allowed officers to search and seize Armendariz’ electronic devices, and the second allowed officers to search for a variety of data stored on those devices. The warrant targeting the Chinook Center allowed officers to obtain date from Facebook including all posts, chats, and events from a seven-day period.

Armendariz and the Chinook Center sued the City of Colorado Springs and several officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that the warrants were overbroad and violated the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. The City moved to dismiss the lawsuit (four times) and the district court dismissed the entire complaint. Armendariz and the Chinook Center appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Tenth Circuit reversed in Armendariz and the Chinook Center’s favor. The Court of Appeals held that (1) officers who drafted and approved the search warrant lacked even arguable probable cause to seize protestor’s electronic devices; (2) the warrants that allowed officers to search six electronic devices for certain keywords and photos, videos, messages, and location were overbroad; (3) the protestor’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was clearly established for qualified immunity purposes; (4) the warrant that authorized search and seizure of all posts, messages, and events from the nonprofit’s social networking account was overboard.

Aggravated Identity Theft Post-Dubin

United States v. Motley, No. 23-3971, 2026 WL 504762 (9th Cir. Feb. 24, 2026)

Motley was convicted after a jury trial for defrauding Medicare by submitting millions of dollars and fraudulent claims for durable medical equipment and services. On appeal, Motley argued that her conviction for aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A should be vacated because the companies Motley used to submit the false claims were enrolled in Medicare under her relatives’ names, not her own.

Just before Motley’s trial, the Supreme Court decided Dubin v. United States, 559 U.S. 110 (2023) which held that a “defendant’s misuse of another person’s means of identification” must be “at the crux of what makes the underlying offense criminal, rather than merely an ancillary feature of a billing method.”

The Ninth Circuit held that Motley’s § 1028A conviction cannot stand because the government failed to advance a theory at trial that the use of her relatives’ names was “critical to the success” of the scheme and that the use itself was fraudulent or deceitful. The Ninth Circuit vacated Motley’s § 1028A conviction and remanded to the district court for resentencing.

Restitution Under VWPA Does Not Provide for Purely Mental or Psychological Harm

United States v. Green, No. 24-3887, 2026 WL 412395 (6th Cir. Feb. 13, 2026)

During their divorce proceedings, Hovanec killed her husband. Hovanec’s mother drove the co-defendants to bury the body in the woods. Hovanec and her paramour, Theodorou, were charged in federal court with conspiracy to import a controlled substance, importation of, and distribution of a controlled substance resulting in death. The mother, Green, was charged with being an accessory after the fact. All three co-defendants pled guilty. In addition to lengthy prison sentences, the defendants were ordered to pay restitution. Green appealed the restitution order requiring her to pay for her grandchildren’s psychological care.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3663, a defendant must pay restitution “in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury to a victim” and a victim may receive restitution for the cost of their “psychological care.” The district court held that the psychological harm itself qualified as bodily injury under the statute.

The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s statutory interpretation. The court found that Congress did not define “bodily injury” in § 3663. The Sixth Circuit adopted the dictionary definition of “bodily injury,” consistent with the Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, and held that bodily injury under the VWPA does not include purely for emotional or psychological harm. The court of appeals remanded the case to the district court for further fact finding on the restitution order.

Obstruction of Justice Sentencing Enhancement Requires Mens Rea Finding

United States v. Ho-Romero, No. 23-3848, 2026 WL 453550 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 2026)

Ho-Romero was sentenced to 60 months imprisonment after pleading guilty to importation of methamphetamine. At sentencing, the district court applied an obstruction of justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 based on alleged threats the defendant made to a witness who testified in the grand jury proceedings.

Section 3C1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines requires that a “defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction.” The district court found that this requirement could be satisfied in some circumstances without any intent to obstruct justice and made no finding as to whether Ho-Romero willfully obstructed or attempted to obstruct.

The Ninth Circuit held that a finding of intent to obstruct justice is required in order for the § 3C1.1 enhancement to apply. Because the district court made no mens rea finding, Ho-Romero’s sentence was vacated and remanded to the district court for re-sentencing.

Contact The Federal White Collar Lawyers At Evergreen Attorneys

Federal criminal defense is a special beast. Most lawyers are not equipped or ready to help you with your federal white collar criminal defense. You need a dedicated team that focuses on defending complex federal criminal defense cases. You need Evergreen Attorneys.

If you are in need of experienced federal criminal defense attorneys to assist you with your case, contact us today. You can call us at (303) 948-1489 or email to [email protected]. You can email David Boyer directly at [email protected].